






# WHAT IS DNS?


## **HISTORY**





## WHAT IS DNS?

#### **IMPLEMENTATION**



#### **TYPES OF DOMAIN NAME SERVERS**

- Authoritative Domain Name Servers
- Recursive Domain Name Servers

#### **DNS ZONE**

- A managed set of resource records for a domain (e.g. kc.com), excluding sub-domains managed by another party.
- Edits to resource records occur on the master name server.
- Zone transfer is used to create multiple authoritative servers called secondary name servers.



## WHAT IS DNS?

### **IMPLEMENTATION**

#### **DNS ZONE**

• Example resource types:

```
✓ e1553.dspg.akamaiedge.net: type A, class IN, addr 96.7.206.121
    Name: e1553.dspg.akamaiedge.net
    Type: A (Host Address) (1)
    Class: IN (0x0001)
    Time to live: 2
    Data length: 4
    Address: 96.7.206.121
    A records: simple name to IPv4
```

v e1553.dspg.akamaiedge.net: type AAAA, class IN, addr 2600:140a:6000:383::611
 Name: e1553.dspg.akamaiedge.net
 Type: AAAA (IPv6 Address) (28)
 Class: IN (0x0001)
 Time to live: 16
 Data length: 16

AAAA records: Simple name to IPv6

```
* MNAME RNAME

$ dig example.com. SOA +multiline
example.com. 3600 IN SOA sns.dns.icann.org. noc.dns.icann.org. (

2016110710 ; serial
7200 ; refresh (2 hours)
3600 ; retry (1 hour)
1209600 ; expire (2 weeks)
3600 ; minimum (1 hour)
Timers
```

SOA records: Start of authority records showing info about the zone

AAAA Address: 2600:140a:60






### DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE

#### **OVERWHELMING DNS SERVERS**

- Amplification: Small requests with huge responses.
  - Reflection: Spoofing a request source such that the victim receives the potentially large response and thereby overwhelming it. Recursive name server responds to victim instead.
    - **Effect?**: Drowns both victim and recursive name servers






### **CACHE POISONING**

# CORRUPTING CACHED ANSWERS IN RECURSIVE NAME SERVERS

- Requires software exploits or protocol weakness.
- Corrupting cache with nefarious entries.

```
*;; ANSWER SECTION:
foo.example.com 3600 IN A 10.17.34.25
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
a.gtld-servers.net. 1540000 IN A
10.17.34.27; (bad guy's IP address)
```






#### MALWARE EXFILTRATION

#### **DNS TUNNELLING**

- Using DNS to transport data as queries.
- Existing tools such as DNS2TCP, DeNISe.




#### **EXFILTRATION MECHANISM**

- Break data into DNS query-sized chunks.
- Possibly encrypt data chunks.
- Prefix data chunks to malicious domain name as subdomains.
- Make DNS query to malicious authoritative servers.
- Server reconstructs exfiltrated data and sends to repository.





#### **RESPONSE RATE LIMITING**




#### **SETTING POLICIES FOR SPECIFIC DOMAINS**

- Using a token pool to bound number of responses to any single client, say:
  - Add 3 tokens every second.
- Refill this token pool after 15 seconds.
- Configuration on authoritative server.
- · Combats DDOS.



## **DNS SECURITY EXTENSIVE (DNSSEC)**




# ANSWER VALIDATION USING PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY

- · Combats cache poisoning.
- Implemented at authorisation and recursive levels.
- Recursive resolver verifies in a backward direction the identity of responding domain servers from target domain to root name server.



### **RESPONSE POLICY ZONE**



#### **IMPLEMENTING LOOKUP POLICIES**

- Based on reputation provided by publicly recognised reputation trackers.
- Query/response match on rules is determined by a trigger.
  - On the name field, IP, authoritative name server, IP address in A and AAAA records of name servers.
- Can respond with:
  - NXDOMAIN: No such domain.
  - NODATA: No data of type attached to domain name.
  - NO-OP: No action required.

<sup>\*</sup> Image Resource: https://center4tobaccopolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/research-icon@2x.jpg.



### **BEST PRACTICES**



# DNS SERVER HARDENING

Use dedicated DNS servers. Use of general servers may introduce OS vulnerabilities, unmanaged ports and improper ACLs.



# SECURE ZONE TRANSFER

Restrict zone transfer to legitimate IP addresses for secondary DNS servers.



# SECURE RECURSION


Secure recursive servers against unauthorized querying to avoid being the amplifier in a DDOS attack.



# SECURE INFRASTRUCTURE

Authoritative DNS servers should be placed inside secure network DMZs to allow control or entry modification from secure servers within DMZ.





## **CONTENT SUPPORT**

*by* Infoblox Engineers & Tim Rooney

### **IMAGE RESOURCES**

*by* Infoblox Engineers

## **GRAPHIC DESIGN**

*by* Ikechukwu Udonsi